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Hellerstein: Criminal Law Decisions

MUCH SOUND, NOT TOO MUCH FURY:
THE SUPREME COURT'S CRIMINAL LAW
DECISIONS DURING THE 1997 TERM
William E. Hellerstein*
Hon. Leon D. Lazer:
Our next speaker is Professor William Hellerstein of Brooklyn
Law School. I have known Professor Hellerstein for a long time.
Indeed, he argued before me when he was Chief of the Appeals
Bureau of the Legal Aid Society and I sat on the Appellate
Division, Second Department. It was always a very interesting and
stimulating experience. Professor Hellerstein was nominated by
the New York State Commission on Nominations for the position
of Court of Appeals four times. You will note he does not wear
robes, but I think it was a great honor and a great recognition of his
talent that the state nominating commission sent his name to the
governor that number of times. He -will speak to us about the
criminal law cases that have come out of the Supreme Court in the
last term.
Prof.William E. Hellerstein:
The 1997 Term saw the Supreme Court heavily engaged in the
criminal law. Of the Court's 91 decisions, 31 resolved criminal
law issues. However, among these many rulings, there were but a
few with broad implications. Indeed, many held minimal interest
for practitioners who do not have cases involving similar issues. A
partial explanation for this phenomenon is the fact that the Court
has the task, perhaps an onerous one, of construing a multiplicity
of federal statutes which, because hastily drawn by a Congress
bent on expanding federal criminal jurisdiction, are also poorly
drawn. Nonetheless, there is plenty left for discussion and, even
after vetting the list of 31, I will be hard pressed to do justice to
those cases which do have substantial significance. Consequently,
I will first discuss the constitutionally based cases of greatest
significance and then I will close with one of the Court's most
noteworthy statutory cases.
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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Court decided two important double jeopardy cases. In
both, the government tame out a big winner. In Hudson v. United
States,1 the Court overruled its nine-year old decision in United
States v. Halper;2 in Monge v. California,3 it confined its decision
in Bullington v. Missouri,4 to capital cases. Let's look at Hudson
first, and let me refresh your recollection as to Halper
Halper was a Medicare fraud case.5 The defendant had already
been punished criminally by both imprisonment and a small fine of
The
$600 for overcharging the government on claims. 6
government then sued him under the False Claims Act, pursuant to
which he was liable for a penalty of $130,000. 7 The Court held
that this sanction can constitute "punishment" under double
jeopardy jurisprudence if it is sufficiently "divorced from any
remedial goal" and, instead, serves the traditional retributive and
deterrent goals of punishment.8 In this sense, said the Halper
Court, a sanction is punishment if it is "overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the injury caused by the defendant's conduct." 9
The Court held that the disproportion between the amount of harm
suffered by the government and the amount of the fine imposed on
Halper compelled the conclusion that the fine could not "fairly be

1118 S.Ct. 488 (1997).
U.S. 435 (1989).
3 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
4451 U.S. 430 (1981).
' Halper,490 U.S. at 437.
2490

6[d.

7

1d. at 438; see also False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731. Section 3729
provides in pertinent part:
a person not a member of an armed force of the United States
is liable to the United States Government for a civil
penalty... if the person... knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved.

Id.
Id. at 452.
9 Id. at 449.
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characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.""'
Since it was decided, Halper has been invoked by all types of
individuals who had suffered an assortment of sanctions such as,
prison discipline, "2sex offender
license revocations,"
3
registration," and various kinds of debarments.' 4 Not surprisingly,
it has caused lower courts and administrative agencies to grapple
6
with its application. 15 It was narrowed in United States v. Ursery,1
and seriously criticized by many, none more vocally than by
Justice Scalia who, in Department of Revenue ofMontana it Kurth

Ranch, 17 urged the Court to overrule it. 8 In Hudson, a majority of
the Court acceded to Justice Scalia's invitation.' 9
Hudson and two other men, former officers in two Oklahoma
federally-chartered banks, violated federal banking law by
10Id.
11 Zukas v. Hinson, 124 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1997) (challenge to FAA

revocation
of a commercial pilot's license).
12 United States v. Galan, 82 F.3d 639 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 179
(1996) (challenge, on double jeopardy grounds, to prosecution for prison escape
following prison disciplinary proceeding).
13 E.B. v. Vemiero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d Cir. 1997) (challenge to "Megan's
Law" as violative of double jeopardy).
4 See, e.g., Jones v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 115 F.3d 1173 (4th Cir.
1997) (challenge to SEC debarment proceeding as violative of double jeopardy);
United States v. Hatfield, 108 F.3d 67 (4th Cir. 1997) (challenge to criminal
fraud prosecution as foreclosed by previous debarment from government
contracting); Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334 (3d Cir. 1996) (challenge to
eviction from federally subsidized housing based on guilty plea to possession of
drug paraphernalia).
15 See generally David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment
Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 Okla. L.
Rev. 587 (1993); Gregory Y. Porter, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court's
On Going Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions. 70
S.CAL. L. REv. 517 (1997).
16 518 U.S. 267 (1996). In this case, the government brought civil forfeiture
proceedings against the defendant's property that was used for drug transactions.
Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of manufacturing marijuana. The
Supreme Court held that civil forfeitures did not constitute additional
punishment for the purpose of invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id.
17511

U.S. 767 (1994).

s Id. at 800-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'9 118 S. Ct 488 (1997).
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arranging a series of bank loans in the names of others but intended
to funnel funds to Hudson so that he could redeem bank stock he
had pledged as collateral on loans on which he had defaulted.20
After discovering the scheme, the Comptroller of the Currency
imposed civil sanctions on all three. Hudson was fined $16,500,
the others, $15,000 and $12,500 respectively. In addition, all three
were barred from engaging in the banking business without the
Comptroller's written consent.21
Three years after the Comptroller imposed civil sanctions, the
government indicted the three on charges of conspiracy,
misapplication of bank funds, and making false record entries. The
indictments were based on the same facts that resulted in the civil
sanctions. 22 The district court granted the defendants' motions to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, but the Tenth Circuit reversed
on the ground that, under Halper,the Comptroller's sanctions were
not punishment because they were not grossly disproportionate to
the harm sustained by the Government as a result of the
defendants' misconduct. 23
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
Halper deviated from the Court's traditional double jeopardy
doctrine in two respects. First, it bypassed what had been the
threshold question in this kind of case by applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause without first determining that the sanction in
question was "criminal in nature." 24 Second, Halper departed from
past practice in that, instead of examining the face of the statute
authorizing the sanction, it took a case-by-case approach, assessing
the sanction actually imposed. 25 This, the Chief Justice observed,
made it impossible to decide the double jeopardy issue until the
case has proceeded to judgment -- even though the Double
20 Id. at 492.

Id.
22id.
2 Id.
24 Id. at 494. The Chief Justice pointed out that the proportionality issue on
which Halper focused had been listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963), but only as one of seven factors to be considered in
determining whether a sanction is a criminal penalty despite a civil label.
However, under the pre-Halperapproach, no single factor was controlling.
25Id.
21
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Jeopardy Clause forbids the government from even attempting to
start a second round of criminal punishment."
Lastly, the Chief Justice noted that other constitutional
provisions protect against "some of the ills at which Halper was
directed:" the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect
against "downright irrational" sanctions, and the Eighth
Amendment protects against excessive civil fines.'
Applying a
cost-benefit analysis, he concluded that "[tihe additional protection
afforded by extending double jeopardy protections to proceedings
heretofore thought to be civil is more than offset by the confusion
created by attempting to distinguish between 'punitive' and
'nonpunitive' penalties.""
Having turned away from Halper, the majority repaired to the
two-part test of United States v. Ward, decided in 1980.29 The first
part requires a court to determine whether, as a matter of statutory
construction, a particular punishment is criminal or civil.3 The
second part requires a determination that the evidence clearly
establishes that the sanctions imposed are "'so punitive in form and
effect as to render them criminal despite Congress' clear intent to
the contrary."' 31 Applying these factors, the majority concluded
that the sanctions imposed by the Comptroller were intended by
Congress to be civil in nature, and that they were not so punitive in
purpose or effect as to be criminal, despite Congress' intent. In
applying the second part, the majority noted that "neither monetary
penalties nor debarment have historically been viewed as
punishment."32 Moreover, the majority said, they do not involve
an "affirmative disability or restraint" in the required sense and
they do not require scienter. Although the conduct for which these
sanctions may be imposed also may be criminal and that they may

261d.

at 495.

27Id.

s Id.
29

448 U.S. 242 (1980).

30Hudson,

311d. at 495
32

118 S. Ct. at 493.

(citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)).

id.
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serve a deterrent purpose does not, ipso facto, render them
"criminal" under Ward.33
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, was delighted to have
Halper interred. However, he reiterated his view that the Double
Jeopardy Clause "prohibits successive prosecution, not successive
Consequently, because the majority opinion
punishment., 34
returns the law to its pre-Halper state, "which acknowledged a
constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments but
required successive criminal prosecutions," he was happy to 'put
35
the Halpergenie back in the bottle."'
Justice Stevens concurred only in the judgment. He saw no
reason to reevaluate Halperbecause the case at bar could be easily
resolved under traditional double jeopardy principles since the civil
and criminal proceedings did not involve the "same offense," as
required by the Blockburger36 overlapping principle test.3 ' He saw
nothing disruptive about the manner in which Halper was being
handled by the lower courts, which, with one exception, had
38
rejected every double jeopardy claim asserted under it.
While agreeing with "much" of the majority's opinion, Justice
Souter urged caution about the requirement that a sanction can be
found to be criminal only on the "clearest proof." He stated that
courts should read that requirement contextually and, given current
enforcement trends, should not be surprised if more defendants
overcome this hurdle than in the past.39
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, suggested
abandoning the "clearest proof' requirement and said the Court
should not have decided in this case whether a sanction statute
should be evaluated on its face or as applied.40

33

Id. at 496.
4Id. at 497 (Scalia, J., concurring).
35Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Department of Revenue of Mont. v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 803-05).
36 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
37
Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38 Id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39
Id. at 500-01 (Souter, J., concurring).
4 Id. at 501-02 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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The Court's abandonment of Halpershould come as no surprise.
In Ursery, the Court had already held that very large forfeiture
orders did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes
even though they were followed by criminal prosecution for the
same offense. Halper, despite Justice Stevens' view that it was a
rare case, was the real surprise and it produced some troubling
results in the lower courts. For example, in S.A. Healj, v.
OSHRC,41 the Seventh Circuit reversed, on double jeopardy
grounds, the imposition of a $318,500 fine imposed by the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission on a
company whose workplace safety violations led to the deaths of
three of its employees because a criminal court had previously
ordered the company to pay $750,000. The Supreme Court
ordered the Seventh Circuit to reconsider its decision in light of
Hudson.42 In short, the Hudson case is very bad news for whitecollar defendants and it will also take with it challenges on double
jeopardy grounds to Megan's Laws.
In Monge v. Califonia,43 the Court held that the Double
Jeopardy Clause does not protect convicted criminals from a
second sentencing proceeding in non-capital cases. Five Justices,
with Justice O'Connor writing for the majority, refused to extend
to non-capital cases the Court's decision in Bullington v.
Missouri,4 which precluded the prosecution from having two bites
at the apple in a capital case. Bullington held that a capital
defendant who received a life sentence during a sentencing
proceeding that featured trial-like protections could not be
sentenced to death upon retrial following an appeal.
Monge arose under California's "three strikes" law.45 Monge
was charged with various marijuana offenses and the prosecution
gave notice of its intention to seek enhancement of any punishment
41

96 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 1996).

118 S. Ct. 623 (1997). On remand, the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Frank Easterbrook, found that under Hudson, sanctions imposed for
42

violation of OSHA standards was a civil penalty. 138 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1998).
Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid sanctions following a
criminal punishment for the same offense. Id. at 688.
43 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
44451 U.S. 430 (1981).
' Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 667(d)(e) (Vest Supp. 1998).
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because Monge was a serious felon under that law. Monge's prior
felony conviction was for assault. If the assault either inflicted
great bodily harm or was perpetrated with a dangerous weapon, it
would qualify as a serious felony and any sentence imposed on the
marijuana convictions would be doubled.46
A jury found Monge guilty on the three marijuana offenses with
which he had been charged. At his sentencing hearing, Monge
waived his right to a jury trial. In addition to the right to a jury
trial, the three strikes law offers a number of other trial-type
protections, including the right of confrontation, the reasonable
doubt standard of proof and the application of the rules of
evidence. The prosecution introduced evidence of Monge's prior
assault conviction and evidence that he had served time in prison
on the conviction. Although the prosecution alleged that Monge
had used a stick in the assault, it did not introduce evidence of that
fact. The sentencing judge found both allegations true -- that
Monge had been convicted of assault and had served a prison
sentence on the conviction -- and imposed a five year sentence for
using a minor to sell marijuana. He then doubled the sentence to
10 years, as required by California's three strikes law. In addition,
a one-year sentence was added for Monge's prior prison sentence,
bringing his total sentence to 11 years.47
On Monge's appeal to the California Court of Appeals, the State
conceded that it had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt (as
required by the three strikes law) that Monge had inflicted great
bodily harm or used a deadly weapon in the prior assault.
Nonetheless, the State asked that the case be remanded and that it
be given another opportunity to sustain its burden of proof. The
Court of Appeals refused, holding that to do so would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A divided California Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply
to noncapital sentencing proceedings.48
The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice O'Connor noted the
Court's historical reluctance to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause
to sentencing proceedings and stated that the traditional rationale
46

Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2248.
Id. at 2248-49.
48
1Id. at 2249.
47
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that sentencing proceedings do not place a defendant in jeopardy
for an "offense" applies here even though the enhancement
provision raises the defendant's sentence beyond the otherwise
applicable statutory maximum.49 Acknowledging that an appellate
reversal of a conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence is
tantamount to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, she
maintained that the same is not true in the sentencing context
except for the exception created by Bullington for capital cases. 50
Monge argued that California's three strikes law afforded
procedural protections that were similar to those in Bullington.
However, Justice O'Connor stated that Bullington did not rest
exclusively on the capital sentencing proceedings resemblance to a
trial of guilt or innocence; it also depended on the fact that the case
was a capital case. She pointed to the Bullington Court's
explanation in regard to the embarrassment, expense, anxiety, and
insecurity that a capital defendant confronts - which are at least
equal to those faced by a defendant at a criminal trial. Also
relevant was the Bullington Court's concern that allowing repeated
efforts to persuade a jury to impose a death sentence would create
an unacceptably high risk of an erroneous capital sentence.51 In
short, Bullington turned on the "death is different" reality.
Justice O'Connor also disposed of the significance of the
presence of procedural safeguards in the California scheme by
rendering them, in a noncapital case, a matter of "legislative
grace," not a constitutional necessity.52 That some states have
chosen to implement procedural safeguards for the protection of
defendants facing "dramatic increases in their sentences" does not
compel extension of the double jeopardy prohibition. To do so,
Justice O'Connor said, could create disincentives for the states to
53
provide such protections.
Of the four dissenters, Justice Stevens was the only member of
the Court who believed that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
resentencing whenever the evidence in the first proceeding is
49

1 d. at 2250.

"M1d.at 2251.
51
1d. at 2251-52.
5Id.
at 2253.
5 Id.
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insufficient.54 He based his position on Chief Justice Burger's
opinion for a unanimous Court in Burks v. United States,55 which
emphasized the critical differences "between insufficiency of the
'5 6
evidence and legal errors that infect the first proceeding."
Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
was the most interesting. He referred to his dissent earlier in the
Term in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,57 in which he
suggested that "it was a grave and doubtful question whether the
Constitution permits a fact that increases the maximum sentence to
which a defendant is exposed to be treated as a sentencing
enhancement rather than an element of a criminal offense." 58
Although he did not answer that question in Almendarez-Torres, he
now felt compelled to state that the Court's holding in AlmendarezTorres that "recidivism" findings do not have to be treated as
elements of the offense, "even ifthey increase the maximum
punishment to which the defendant is exposed.., was ... a grave
constitutional error affecting the most fundamental of rights."5' 9
The majority's position, he asserted, would allow a legislature to
convert most elements of crimes to sentencing factors and commit
them to judges for determination without the protections of the Bill
of Rights.' Although California's scheme was not "sinister," he
hypothesized that a State "could repeal all of the violent crimes in
its criminal code and replace them with only one offense,
'knowingly causing injury to another,' bearing a penalty of 30 days
in prison." It could then subject that offense "to a series of
'sentencing enhancements' authorizing additional punishment, up
to life imprisonment or death, on the basis of various levels of
mens rea, severity of injury, and other surrounding circumstances,"
and leave it to a judge to decide by a preponderance of evidence
whether the defendant committed those enhancing factors.61
' Id. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
5 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
56
Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998).
58
Monge, 118 S.Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59

Id. at 2257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
oId. at 2255 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61Id. at 2255-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Certainly, I have no quarrel with the majority's reliance on the
fact that death is different. I have greater difficulty with the
majority's reasoning that this fact requires that the double jeopardy
principle established in Bullington should be limited to capital
cases. First, as Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court bypasses the
critical distinction between reversals based on insufficient
evidence and those based on legal error. A defendant whose
sentence has been enhanced considerably, despite the insufficiency
of the evidence, can suffer from serious anxieties, albeit of a lesser
degree than if faced with the possibility of execution. Giving the
prosecution a second chance to correct its original failure of proof
thus can prolong a noncapital defendant's agony through no fault
of his own. The distinction, which the Court has drawn, between a
capital and non-capital case in this circumstance seems illogical.
EXCESSIVE FINES
The 5-4 decision in United States v. Bajakajian6 was arguably
the most surprising of the entire Term. In 1993, the Court held that
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to
both civil and criminal forfeitures.3 However, the Court did not
furnish a test for applying the clause. In Bajakajian,the Court held
that a forfeiture that is punitive in nature is unconstitutional if it is
"grossly disproportional" to the underlying crime. The result
surprised many and it produced a severe dissent. The outcome
came about only because Justice Thomas abandoned his usual
constitutional companions and, indeed, wrote the majority opinion.
In fact, this was the first time, I believe, that Justice Thomas has
ever been found in the company of Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer in a 5-4 decision.
Bajakajian and his wife attempted to leave the United States with
$357,144 in cash without reporting their plans to the government
as required by the federal currency reporting statute-mandating
disclosure of sums over $10,000.64 The money, however, had been
62 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998).

' Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993); Alexander v. United States,
509 U.S. 544 (1993).
64 1 U.S.C.§§ 5316(a)(1)(A), 5322(a) (1994).
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obtained lawfully and was being taken abroad to repay a lawful
debt. Bajakajian pled guilty to willfully violating the reporting
requirement but went to trial on the forfeiture issue.65 The district
court held that the entire amount was subject to forfeiture under the
statute but that to do so would be grossly disproportionate to
Bajakajian's offense and thus would violate the Excessive Fines
Clause. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.6
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas first stated that
forfeitures are "fines" if they constitute punishment for an offense
and, in this case, it qualified because it was imposed at the end of a
criminal proceeding, required a conviction, and could not be
imposed on an innocent owner.67 He observed that the
government's only loss from the failure to report is the loss of
information, which cannot be rectified by the government's
confiscation of the defendant's money. 8
Justice Thomas distinguished the forfeiture at issue from
remedial forfeitures, which compensate the government for lost
revenues, and from traditional civil in rem forfeitures. He
emphasized that precedents related to civil in rem forfeitures of
property tainted by crime are inapposite because such forfeitures
were historically considered non-punitive and thus outside the
Excessive Fines Clause. 69 Here, the government proceeded not
against the property but against the defendant himself which
rendered irrelevant the issue of whether the money was the
instrumentality of the offense. The forfeiture is punitive, Justice
Thomas observed, "and the test for excessiveness of a punitive
forfeiture involves solely a proportionality determination." 70
Justice Thomas then adopted the grossly disproportionate test
applied by the district court. In accepting that test, he deemed
6518 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) provides for forfeiture of "any property... involved
in" an offense under Section 5316.
66 Bajakajian, 118 S. Ct. at 2032-33.
67

d. at 2035.

61Id.at 2034.

69

Id. at 2034-35. Justice Thomas cautioned against reading the decision as

implying that "modem" civil in rem forfeiture statutes are necessarily nonpunitive and thus unreachable by the Excessive Fines Clause; the clause is
triggered by both remedial and punitive elements, he said. Id. at 2035 n.6.
70
Id. at 2036.
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releant two factors: "that judgments about the appropriate
punishment for an:.offense_,bPlong in the first instance to the
legislature," and-that "any-judicial, determination regarding the
gravity -ofa particular criminal offense will be inherently
imprecise." 71 He pointed: out that these factors point away from a
requirement of "'strict proportionality between the amount of a
punitiye :forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense" ,and
toward, th "'gross- disproportionality" standard that the Court had
followed: in: interpreting the,, Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause? 2 -Applying, this standard,. Justice Thomas determined that
forfeiture of the :entire, $357,144 was grossly disproportionate.
Bajakajian's onIy crime was a failure to report the money that was
lawfully. -obtained and, was intended to be used for a lawful
purpose.. Moreover, %theidefendant himself was not the type of
person Ahelay was intendedto-, snare - drug traffickers, money
lalinderets, and tax evaders.7,
Justice' Kennedy-'joined by, the Chief Justice and Justices
OConnor and Scalia, dissented, stating that money launderers-will
4
He maintained that "the
"rjbiee" ,'at the -Coiirfs decisi
decision- is: distuibing both for, its specific holding and' for the
broadefripieavalt foresadow. T Apart from a departure from a
long' line',f precddent;,Justice Kennedy accused the majority of
ignoring Congress" intent to :require total forfeiture in recognition
of flh diffieulty ofrfoving the relationship'of unreported cash to
other crimes.76 He acknowledged that the majority's gross
disproportionality test was "a proper way" to enforce the Excessive
Fines Clause:- H-e argued, however,' that the majority had
misapplied it by treating-Bajakajima's crime' as much less serious
than it actually was. He would have held that the forfeiture of the
dntif6 amountbf-unreported-monies is justifiable'as long as the

71

Id. at 2037.

7

Id. at 2038.

74

Id. at 2046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2044 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

7
Id.
76
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government can prove the non-reporting was willful." Justice
Kennedy also opined that the majority's holding could have the
long-term effect of undermining the Excessive Fines Clause. By
suggesting that in rem forfeitures are not subject to excessiveness
analysis, the majority has invited Congress and legislatures
generally to create exceedingly harsh in rem forfeitures.78
This decision again signifies the Court's involvement with, and
concern about, the Government's use of its forfeiture and civil
remedy powers that supplement criminal statutes. The past decade
has witnessed a backing and filling of doctrinal effort, as
evidenced by the overruling of the Halper case in Hudson of which
I spoke earlier. The decision in Bajakajian reflects the Court's
concern with the government's heavy-handed approach in the use
of the forfeiture mechanism. The open question is whether the
decision extends no further than application of the reporting
requirement statutes at issue or whether it portends greater scrutiny
by the Court of the entire instrumentalities doctrine. Here, the
government argued that Bajakajian's $357,144 was the
instrumentality of the crime itself -- the failure to report it. But
Justice Thomas responded not only that Bajakajian's cash was not
an instrumentality because it did not directly facilitate the
commission of his offense, but that a fine is excessive regardless of
whether the cash to be forfeited can be called an instrumentality.79
It is this rejection of the mere label "instrumentality" which
suggests this case may have a reach beyond the issue that it
resolved.
THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE:
POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE
In United States v. Scheffer, ° Justice Thomas returned to form as
he authored the Court's opinion holding that Military Rule of
Evidence 707(a), which prohibits the admission at trial of
polygraph evidence under any circumstance, does not violate a
778 Id. at 2045 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2046-47 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 2038-39.
8' 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
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defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 8' The case is
of considerable significance because, by upholding the validity of a
per se rule of exclusion, it ends the constitutional discussion as to
the admissibility of polygraph evidence. The decision also runs
counter to the trend, signified by the Court's landmark ruling in
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals,' in favor of allowing
scientific evidence into evidence even if the methodologies
involved are not universally accepted in the relevant scientific
community.
Scheffer, an airman in the United States Air Force, sought to
introduce the favorable results of a polygraph at his court martial
for, among other things, using methamphetamine. According to
the polygraph examiner, the results indicated no deception when
Scheffer answered questions denying he had used the drug.
Understandably, Scheffer wanted to introduce the polygraph
results to counter a positive drug test the prosecution had
introduced against him and to bolster his defense of innocent
ingestion. Invoking Rule 707, the court-martial judge ruled the
polygraph results inadmissible. Scheffer testified in his own
defense and denied using any drugs. He was convicted of all
charges.8 The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, in a 3-2 vote, held that Rule 707's per se preclusion of
polygraph evidence violates an accused's constitutional right to
present a defense and reversed Scheffer's conviction.8
In reversing, Justice Thomas made three principle points: (1) a
defendant's right to present relevant evidence is subject to
reasonable restrictions so long as such restrictions are not
(2) the Court has found arbitrariness or
arbitrary;'
disproportionality in the exclusion of evidence only where it
11 The rule states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a
polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to
an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not
be admitted into evidence." Id.
82509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8

118 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
14 44 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
8Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1264.
3 Scheffer,
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infringed on a weighty interest of the defendant;86 and (3) Rule
707, due to the lack of consensus that polygraph evidence is
reliable, "is a rational and proportional means of advancing the
87
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence.,
Scheffer relied on three prior Supreme Court decisions: (1) Rock
v. Arkansas,88 in which the Court held that the exclusion of the
defendant's hypnotically induced testimony violated the
defendant's right to present a defense, (2) Washington v. Texas, 9
in which the Court struck down, as violative of the Compulsory
Process Clause, statutes which prevented co-defendants or coparticipants in a crime from testifying for one another, and (3)
Chambers v. Mississippi,9° where the Court found a due process
violation in application of the state's voucher rule which prevented
the defendant from impeaching his own witness, and the hearsay
rule, which prevented the defendant from introducing the
testimony of three persons to whom that witness had confessed.
Justice Thomas distinguished all three cases on their facts and
concluded that "unlike the evidentiary rules at issue in those cases,
Rule 707 does not implicate any significant interest of the
accused." 91 He pointed out that Rule 707 did not keep Scheffer
from presenting the jury with evidence and details of the crime
from his perspective, but instead merely prevented Scheffer "from
2
introducing expert testimony to bolster his own credibility."
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Souter joined
those parts of Justice Thomas' opinion which made two additional
points - that Rule 707 also serves legitimate interests in preventing
mini-trials on collateral matters such as credibility, and in
protecting the jury's "core function" as the arbiter of credibility.93
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, concurred in an opinion which expressed doubt about the
86 id.
87Id. at 1266.

88483 U.S. 44 (1987).
89 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
90 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
91Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. at 1268.
92 Id. at 1268-69.
93Id at 1263, 1266-67.
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wisdom of a per se rule of exclusion. 4 Nonetheless, Kennedy
concluded that the "ongoing debate about polygraphs" saved the
rule from condemnation as arbitrary or disproportionate."
However, he was critical of Justice Thomas' idea that jurors should
be shielded from witnesses' opinions on the ultimate issue, which
he viewed as outmoded and one that the drafters of the Federal
Rules of Evidence had abandoned.'
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent in which he argued that
the majority struck the wrong balance between the defendant's
constitutional right to present a defense and the interests served by
Rule 707. 97 He pointed out that many studies put the reliability of
polygraphs at 85 to 90 percent and that exculpatory polygraphs are
more likely to be accurate than inculpatory ones.
Given this
reality, a per se exclusion is unjustified, he concluded. Instead, he
said, doubts about reliability in individual cases should be resolved
through the usual adversary method, and that the problem of
collateral litigation is no worse in this context than in cases
involving other kinds of expert testimony. 9
I find myself troubled by the Court's sledgehammer approach to
the issue of polygraph evidence. While the Scheffer decision
leaves the States and the Congress free to provide for the
admission of such evidence, the Court's ruling is not structured to
serve as a catalyst for further movement in that direction. Also, the
decision seems counter-intuitive to contemporary thinking about
the admissibility of scientific evidence at trial and to the Court's
own decision in Daubert.
Daubert is willing to trust to the wisdom of trial judges' with
regard to the reliability of scientific evidence whose techniques
have not yet received universal acceptance. Yet in a case in which
a defendant's ability to demonstrate his innocence is at stake, the
Court is not willing to do so. What is gained by a constitutional
ruling which upholds a per se ban on all polygraph evidence eludes
IId. 1269 (Kennedy, L, concurring).
concurring).

95 Id. (Kennedy, J.,

9 Id. at 1269-70 (Kennedy, L, concurring).
7Id. at 1275-76 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
98 Id. at

1276 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
IId. at 1277-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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me. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, "[b]etween 1981
and 1997, the Department of Defense conducted over 400,000
to resolve issues arising in
polygraph examinations
counterintelligence, security, and criminal investigations. ' ' "° In
other words, on a daily basis the government makes critical
decisions, which affect our national security by relying to some
degree on the accuracy of the polygraph. Yet the Court can find
nothing in the Constitution's guarantee of the right to present a
defense (which, despite Justice Thomas' less than enthusiastic
embrace is still there), to secure to a defendant the right to at least
proffer a favorable polygraph in evidence against the same
government which seeks to deprive him of his freedom. I find
such ironies difficult to overcome.
THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
In Gray v. Maryland,01° a closely divided Court decided an
important Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause question in the
Brutonl°2 line of cases. It held that editing a non-testifying codefendant's confession by replacing inculpatory references to a
jointly tried defendant with a blank space or the word "deleted" is
insufficient to protect the defendant's rights.
As you may recall, Bruton involved the robbery trial of two
defendants, Evans and Bruton. Evans confessed to the police and
inculpated Bruton as well. The prosecution introduced Evans'
confession against both defendants. Bruton objected, claiming that
because Evans did not testify at trial, he was deprived of his right
of confrontation. The court overruled the objection and Evans'
confession implicating Bruton was read into evidence. The
Supreme Court reversed Bruton's conviction on the ground that,
notwithstanding the trial judge's limiting instruction introducing
that portion of Evans' confession implicating Bruton without
affording Bruton the right to cross examine him, violated the Sixth
Amendment.

'ioId.at 1272 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101118

S.Ct. 1151 (1998).

1

02Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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However, in Richardson v. Marsh,10 3 the Court considered a
redacted confession and held that a confession edited so as to omit
any reference to the non-confessing defendant was not within the
Bruton rule, even though the confession could be read, in the light
of other evidence, to incriminate the defendant.
Since Bruton was decided, and as was the case in Richardson,
the general practice surrounding the introduction of statements of
non-testifying co-defendants has been to redact the statement to
eliminate all mention of the other defendant. In Gray, the
prosecutor substituted the word "DELETED" or blank spaces for
Gray's name every time the co-defendant's confession implicated
Gray. Consequently, the Gray case fell into something of a noman's land between Bruton and Richardson in that it presented the
Court with the issue, left open in Richardson, of whether redaction
that replaces a defendant's name with an obvious indication of
deletion, such as a blank space, the word "deleted," or a similar
symbol, still falls with Bruton's ambit. By a 5-4 vote, with Justice
Breyer writing for the majority, the Court tilted toward Bnton and
held that the admission of a confession redacted in such manner is
equivalent to admission of the confession in unredacted form,
which Bruton precludes.
Gray and Bell were tried jointly for beating to death Stacy
Williams. Bell, who did not testify at trial, had given the police a
confession which inculpated Gray by name. When Bell's
confession was read to the jury, it stated that the victim was beaten
by "me, DELETED, DELETED, and a few other guys." The jury
was also provided with a written version of the confession
containing blanks where the names had been. At trial, the
prosecutor also elicited from a police detective that after Bell gave
him the confession, the detective was able to arrest Gray. The
judge instructed the jury to consider the confession only against the
declarant, Bell.'O
In holding that this redaction was constitutionally unacceptable,
Justice Breyer emphasized that Bell's confession, like that in
Bruton, originally referred to and directly implicated Gray. Unlike
Richardson's redacted confession, Bell's confession as redacted
481 U.S. 200 (1987).
Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1153.

103
104
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referred directly to the "existence" of the non-confessing
Justice Breyer explained that a jury will often react
defendant.'
similarly to an unredacted confession and a confession redacted
with "deleted" or with a blank space because the jury, will often
realize that the confession refers specifically to the defendant. He
emphasized that, in this case, the prosecutor made that leap very
easy by following the police officer's recitation of the redacted
confession with a question that suggested a link between the
confession and Gray's arrest."' 6
Justice Breyer conceded that, as in Richardson, the jury had to
make an inference to conclude that the confession incriminated the
defendant. However, he distinguished Richardson in that the
statements in that case did not refer directly to the defendant and
required evidentiary linkage for their incriminating effect, i.e.,
Richardson's own testimony at trial that he was in car mentioned
in his co-defendant's confession. In Gray's case, however, Bell's
statements obviously referred to Gray and no additional evidence
was required before that inference could be drawn.'0 7
Justice Breyer acknowledged that the Richardson Court feared
that the application of Bruton to confessions that are incriminating
by connection would force prosecutors either not to use such
confessions or to abandon joint trials. He pointed out, however,
that confessions may be edited rather freely in order to cure the
Bruton problem; in Gray's case, he could not understand why the
confession could not have been redacted to state that the victim
was beaten by "me and a few other guys."'0 8
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy and Thomas, dissented, and viewed the case closer to
Richardson than Bruton.1' 9 He believed that as long as a jury must
rely on other trial evidence to conclude that the word "deleted" or
some other substitute refers to the defendant, the incriminating
inference is not so powerful as to require departing from the
normal rule that juries are presumed to follow the trial court's
'0o Id. at 1155.
10 6 Id.

07
Id. at 1156-57.
8
'o
Id.at 1157.
" Id. at 1159 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

'
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instructions. He conceded "that confessions redacted to omit the
defendant's name are more likely to incriminate than confessions
redacted to omit any reference to his existence.""10 He thought it
more important, however, that "confessions redacted to omit the
defendant's name are less likely to incriminate than confessions
that expressly state it.'
He concluded that "the Court's
extension of Bruton to name-redacted confessions 'as a class' will
seriously compromise 'society's compelling interest in finding,
convicting, and punishing those who violate the law."'' 1
I find it hard to quarrel with the correctness of the majority
decision. Two features underlie Justice Scalia's dissent: his
reliance on the jury's capacity to follow a court's instruction to
consider the co-defendant's confession as applicable only to him,
and his concern about making it more difficult for the prosecution
to secure a conviction. Although Justice Scalia is correct that
courts generally emphasize the ability of jurors to follow
instructions, where co-defendant's confessions are concerned, it
must be remembered that Bruton itself specifically overruled
DelliPaoli v. United States,"3 which also had accepted the
proposition that juries could abide by an instruction that a codefendant's confession should be applied only to the confessing
defendant. Bruton itself held that the general assumption that
juries follow instructions was not adequate in the case of codefendant's confessions at a joint trial. Therefore, Justice Scalia's
reliance on the general proposition is not persuasive. Secondly, I
fail to see how the prosecutor's task is rendered more difficult by
prohibiting use of the term "deleted" or use of blank spaces in a
printed version. This can be done easily before trial and, as the
majority pointed out, the confession could have said that "I beat
' 4
the victim along with some other guys. ,"
Gray is significant because it establishes a rule that goes beyond
the specific facts of the case. The Court could have reached the
no Id. at 1160 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

m Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
m Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426
(1986)).
113 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
114 Gray, 118 S. Ct. at 1157.
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same result by relying exclusively on the fact that the prosecutor's
questioning of the police officer conveyed to the jury the obvious
suggestion that Gray had been implicated because his arrest
followed closely upon Bell's confession, thus giving it the same
effect as an entirely unredacted confession. And, some may
choose to read the opinion as limited to the Court's precise holding
"that the confession here at issue, which substituted blanks and the
word 'delete' for the respondent's proper name, falls within the
' 5
class of statements to which Bruton's protections apply."
However, though on many occasions dissenting opinions overstate
the reach a majority opinion, I do not think that is the case here.
Thus, I agree with Justice Scalia's view that the Court's decision
establishes a broad rule of preclusion. 6 As Justice Breyer stated:
"we believe that, considered as a class, redactions that replace a
proper name with an obvious blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or
similarly notify the jury that a name has been deleted are similar
enough to Bruton's unredacted confessions as to warrant the same
legal results."... 7 In this statement lies the importance of the case.
JURY DISCRIMINATION
In Campbell v. Louisiana,"' the Court extended a white
defendant's ability to challenge the exclusion from petit juries of
persons not of his race, to the grand jury. As you may recall, seven
years ago, in Powers v. Ohio," 9 the Court held that a defendant
may raise an equal protection challenge to the prosecution's
exercise of peremptory jury challenges even if the defendant is not
of the same race as the excluded venirepersons. In Campbell, the
Court held that the defendant, who is white, had third-party
standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks from service as grand
jury forepersons.
Campbell, who was convicted of murder, claimed that in the
Louisiana Parish where he was indicted, no black had served as
115

Id.

116 Id. at
7

1

1160-1161 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1156.

"1 118 S. Ct. 1419 (1998).

19 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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grand jury foreperson from 1976 to 1993, even though blacks
The Louisiana
constituted 20 percent of registered voters.
Supreme Court held that Campbell had no standing to raise the
challenge because he was not a member of the racial group that
suffered the alleged discrimination. The Court also rejected
Campbell's due process claim because the foreperson's duties were
purely ministerial. 12° Justice Kennedy, who has been in the
forefront on jury discrimination issues, wrote the Court's opinion.
Justice Thomas dissented in part and called for the overruling of
Powers. He was joined by Justice Scalia, who had dissented in
Powers.
Justice Kennedy first noted that whatever the functions of the
foreperson of the grand jury in Louisiana, he or she has the same
full voting powers as other grand jury members. Secondly, that the
judge selects the foreperson from the grand jury venire before the
remaining members of the grand jury have been chosen by lot
means that the judge has selected one member of the grand jury
outside the drawing system used to compose the rest of the grand
jury. These considerations, Justice Kennedy concluded, required
the Court to treat the case as one alleging discriminatory selection
of grand jurors.2
In Powers, the Court established a three-part test for third-party
standing: (1) the defendant must suffer an injury in fact, (2) the
defendant must have a close relationship to the excluded jurors,
and (3) there must exist some hindrance to the excluded jurors'
assertion of their rights on their own. Justice Kennedy concluded
that application of these criteria to the instant case required the
same result as in Powers.1 " First, he pointed out, any defendant
suffers a "significant injury in fact" when racial discrimination
taints the composition of the grand jury, regardless of whether the
defendant is of the same race as the targets of the discrimination.'2
The grand jury, he noted, is a "central component of the criminal
justice process" charged with making numerous significant
decisions. If discrimination infects the selection process, then
120 Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1421-22.
121Id. at 1422.

'2id.at 1422-23.
123 Id. at 1423.
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"doubt is cast over the fairness of all subsequent decisions." It
does not matter that the discrimination may not be visible in the
particular case.1'2 As to the other two conditions, Justice Kennedy
stated that, as in Powers, a defendant will be an effective advocate
for the excluded jurors, and that they face economic disincentives
for pursuing legal action to vindicate their own rights. 1
It is important to appreciate what the Court did not decide.
Because it determined that Campbell had third party standing, the
Court did not have to decide whether Campbell could claim a
violation of his own equal protection rights. It also did not have to
decide Campbell's due process claim. Nonetheless, Justice
Kennedy pointed out that the Louisiana Supreme Court had erred
in relying on Hobby v. United States.26 which had held that
discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury foreperson
did not infringe principles of fundamental fairness because the
foreperson's duties were "ministerial." The difference between
this case and Hobby, Justice Kennedy emphasized, is that the
Hobby foreperson "was selected from the existing grand jurors, so
the decision to pick one grand juror over another, at least arguably,
affected the defendant only if the foreperson was given some
significant duties that he would not have had as a regular grand
juror.""
The critical distinction between Hobby and this case,
Kennedy pointed out, "is not the foreperson's performance of its
duty to preside, but performance as a grand juror, namely voting to
28
charge Campbell with second-degree murder."'
Akin to Luciano Pavarotti's signature aria, Nessun Dorma, from
Puccini's Turandot, Justice Thomas's penchant for overruling prior
precedent 29 again presented itself in Campbell. Here, he disputed
the majority's finding of injury in fact and stated that
discrimination in the selection of just one member of the grand
124

Id.

at 1424.
468 U.S. 339 (1984).
127 Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1425.
'25Id.
126

128 Id.
29

' See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 117 S. Ct.

1590 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1650-1651 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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jury "could hardly constitute an 'overt' act that would affect the
remainder of the grand jury proceedings, much less the subsequent
trial."' 3 That Campbell was found guilty, in Justice Thomas'
view, washed out any error that occurred in the grand jury. Justice
Thomas also disputed that the other conditions required by Powers
were met. He maintained that there did not exist a "close
relationship" or "common interest" between defendants and
venirepersons who are passed over for grand jury service. Justice
Thomas could not "understand how the rights of blacks excluded
from jury service can be vindicated by letting a white murderer go
free."..' He then reiterated his previously stated position that the
entire line of cases since Batson,3 2 "is a misguided effort to
remedy a general societal wrong by using the Constitution to
regulate the traditionally discretionary exercise of peremptory
challenges.' ' 3
The Campbell case is significant primarily as a continuation of
the process of protecting the rights of jurors as citizen-participants
in the criminal justice system. Justice Kennedy has previously
demonstrated a very strong commitment to the eradication of racial
discrimination against jurors qua jurors, and his willingness to
expand third-party standing in this case evidences that predilection.
The Court's previous decision in Georgia v. McCollum,? holding
Batson applicable to racial peremptory challenges utilized by
defense counsel, is the high water mark of the Court's intention to
secure the rights of jurors intrinsically. Campbell is easily
understood as a logical, afortiori,application of that commitment.
On the other hand, Justice Thomas' dissent stems not only from a
basic disagreement with that principle, but from Justice Thomas'
broader concern that Batson itself was a great mistake. As he
argued in his McCollum concurrence, "'[t]he Batson doctrine,
rather than helping to ensure the fairness of criminal trial, serves
13

Campbell, 118 S. Ct at 1427 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
1311d. at 1426.
132Batson

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

133 Campbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1426 n.1. (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting

inpart).
134

505 U.S. 42 (1992).
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only to undercut that fairness by emphasizing the rights of
excluded jurors at the expense of the traditional protections
135
accorded criminal defendants of all races.'
Justice Thomas' hostility to Batson and its progeny is one that
many defense attorneys felt about the Court's extension in
McCollum of Batson to the defense bar. It is also one of those few
issues on which Justice Thomas and Justice Marshall shared
common ground. The Court, in McCollum, could have limited
Batson to the prosecution and accepted the defense bar's position
that exercise by defense counsel of a peremptory challenge did not
constitute state action and thus did not implicate the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, the Court found state action, not in the
conduct of defense counsel, but in the judicial imprimatur of the
defense's exercise of a peremptory challenge and the effect of such
imprimatur on the jurors themselves. The Court's commitment to
jurors in the Batson line of cases of which Campbell but is the
latest word shows that the Court and Justice Thomas are not on the
same page. The Court's purpose since Batson has been to cleanse,
as best as it can, the entire criminal justice trial process of racial
bias. That the defendant's rights are secondary was a bridge
crossed in McCollum. If such were not the case, then Justice
Thomas' argument might have considerable weight. But the Court
has chosen a more predominant value and its ruling in Campbell v.
Louisiana is consistent with that choice.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Court decided two Fourth Amendment cases this term. In
United States v. Ramirez, 36 the Court addressed the Fourth
Amendment standard to be applied when the police damage
property when making an unannounced entry while executing a
search warrant. In PennsylvaniaBoard of Probationand Parolev.
Scott,137 the Court was asked to decide whether the exclusionary

"ICampbell, 118 S. Ct. at 1426 n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 60-62 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
136 118 S. Ct. 992 (1998).
137118 S.Ct 2014 (1998).
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rule applied to state parole revocations. In both cases the
government prevailed.
In Ramirez, for the third time in four years, the Court addressed
the Fourth Amendment's knock and announce rule. As you may
recall, in Wilson v. Arkansas,"' decided in 1995, the Court held the
Fourth Amendment did include a knock and announce requirement
but also held that the requirement was not a rigid one and that the
lower courts would have to determine the circumstances under
which an unannounced entry is reasonable. Two years later, in
Richards v. Wisconsin, 139 the Court rejected Wisconsin's per se
rule that when making a drug arrest pursuant to a warrant, the
police need never follow a knock and announce requirement.
Instead, the Court held that no-knock entries are not unreasonable
if the police have a "reasonable suspicion" that knocking and
announcing their presence would "be dangerous or futile, or that it
would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for
example, allowing the destruction of evidence."' 4°
Ramirez presented the issue of whether, when the police execute
a warrant and destroy property, a higher degree of exigency is
required than when police simply dispense with the knock and
announce requirement. With Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for a
unanimous Court, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
contains no such requirement.
The facts were not propitious for a different outcome. Federal
agents obtained a warrant authorizing an unannounced entry to
search Ramirez's home for one Shelby, who was a fugitive.
Shelby had a violent record, including a previous escape and the
agents had been told by their informant that Ramirez may have
guns stored in his garage. Executing the warrant, one of the agents
broke out a window to the garage and stuck his gun through the
opening to keep the occupants of the home from gaining access to
the firearms that he believed were stored there. Ramirez, who was
asleep with his wife, heard the commotion and thought he was
being burglarized. He grabbed a gun and fired a shot into the
garage roof. When he realized that he was dealing with police
138514

U.S. 927 (1995).

119
117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997).
140Id.at 1421.
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officers, he surrendered. Shelby was not present but Ramirez was
a prior felon and thus was charged with unlawful possession of
firearms.

141

The Ninth Circuit had previously held that a "mild exigency"
was sufficient to justify a no-knock entry when no property was
damaged, 42 but "more specific inferences of exigency" were
required when police damaged property.141 Applying that principle
to this case, the court held that the agents executing the warrant did
not meet the higher standard and it affirmed the district court's
suppression of the firearms.'" The court also held that the entry
violated 18 U.S.C. Section 3109.245
In reversing, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that although neither
Wilson nor Richards specifically addressed the issue of how
property damage should figure into the determination of the
reasonableness of a no-knock entry, it was obvious from those
cases, especially Richards, that reasonableness does not turn on
whether property is damaged; the "reasonable suspicion" standard
of Richards does not depend on whether the police must destroy
146
property in order to enter.
Rehnquist acknowledged that the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment does speak to the manner of executing a
search warrant. However, the issue of whether an exigency existed
to justify a no-knock entry must be viewed separately from
whether the entry was effected reasonably. Thus, "[e]xcessive or
unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may
violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is
141
Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 995-96.

United States v. Von Willie, 59 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 1995).
143 See United States v. Becker, 23 F.3d 1537, 1539 (9th Cir. 1994).
142

United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1996).
1908. 18 U.S.C. § 3109 provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window
of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to
execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and
purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the
warrant.

145 Id. at

Id.

146 Ramirez, 118 S. Ct. at 996.
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lawful and the fruits of the search not subject to suppression."' 47 In
this case, Rehnquist concluded, the agents had reasonable
suspicion justifying their no-knock entry and breaking the garage
48
window was reasonable under the circumstances.
Rehnquist also made short shrift of the Section 3109 argument.
Ramirez had argued that the language of the statute, by authorizing
property damage to free a trapped officer, should be construed as
denying the police authority to damage property for other reasons.
Rehnquist responded by stating that Section 3109 codifies the
exceptions to the common-law requirement, including exigent
circumstances, and that the exception's applicability to particular
cases is measured by the same standard the Court articulated in
149
Richards.
The primary argument against the Court's decision is that
dispensing with a higher exigency threshold for property damage
in no-knock entries can result in less privacy and security and more
dangerous in-home confrontations between residents and law
enforcement officers. As Ramirez argued, a violent entry invites a
violent defensive response, as evidenced by his own belief that he
was being burglarized. The problem
rwith the first argument is that
the privacy invasion is complete with the dispensation of the knock
and announce requirement and is not contingent upon damage to
property. The problem with the second is that, on the facts of this
case especially, the popping of the garage window did not seem
unreasonable as a means to ensure that the occupants of the
premises could not grab weapons which the agents believed might
be in the garage.
In Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,' the
Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence
introduced at parole revocation hearings. Given the Court's
current composition and the Court's distaste for the exclusionary
rule spanning at least the last 25 years, the outcome is no surprise.
But that the vote was 5-4 makes life interesting in that four
members of the Court do not share that hostility and one of the
147 Id.
14

49

Id. at 997.

Id. at 997-98.
'" 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998).
1
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four, Justice Stevens, continues to believe that the exclusionary
rule "'is constitutionally required, not as a 'right' explicitly
incorporating the fourth amendment's prohibitions, but as a
remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed in
fact." 151
Parole officers conducted a search of Scott's home in which he
lived with his parents. The search uncovered several weapons
which, under the terms of his parole, Scott was prohibited from
possessing. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's suppression decision, finding that the search was
unreasonable because it was based only upon "mere speculation"
rather than "a reasonable suspicion" of a parole violation. 152
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, applied the cost-benefit
analysis that has long been operative as to the exclusionary rule.
And once that analysis makes its appearance at the outset of an
opinion by the Court, there is little suspense left as to the outcome
with respect to how well the exclusionary rule will fare in a
discrete context. Thus, the Court's prior decisions precluding the
53
application of the exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings,
civil tax proceedings,' 54 and civil deportation proceedings 55
figured early in Justice Thomas' opinion and formed the
foundational core of his argument. 156 All that remained was for
him to demonstrate that parole revocation proceedings were of the
same genre and he set out to do so. Although the die was cast, the
question remains whether Justice Thomas' perception of the parole
revocation process squares with reality. Justice Souter, speaking
for himself and Justices Stevens, Breyer and Ginsburg, offered
quite a different view of that process. Let's take a look at each
perspective.

151

Id. at 2023 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting Potter Stewart, The Road to

Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the
Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1389
(1963)).
152 Id. at 2018.
'53 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
'5 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
5INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
"' Scott, 118 S. Ct. at 2019-22.
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In Justice Thomas' view, applying the exclusionary rule to
parole revocation proceedings "would both hinder the functioning
of state parole systems and alter the traditionally flexible,
administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings."'157 On
other hand, argued Justice Thomas, exclusion "would provide only
minimal deterrence benefits in this context, because application of
the rule in criminal trial contexts already provides significant
deterrence of unconstitutional searches."' 58 Justice Thomas also
pointed out that the state has a particularly strong interest in
ensuring that parolees' violations of their release conditions are
brought to light because the costs to society of excluding reliable,
probative evidence of such violations are substantial given that
parolees, especially those who have already committed parole
violations, are more likely than the average person to commit
crimes. 159
Justice Thomas saw the parole revocation process as a nonadversarial, administrative process which was ill-suited to
application of the exclusionary rule because of the extensive
litigation over the lawfulness of a search that goes with it. Parole
revocation proceedings, he pointed out, generally are not
conducted by judges, but instead by parole boards, whose members
need not be judicial officers or even lawyers. In the long run, he
argued, the financial costs of creating a new, more rigid system
might reduce the state's incentive to extend parole to prisoners,
thus disadvantaging parolees in general. 16° Also, he maintained,
the deterrent benefits of applying the rule would not outweigh
these costs because in most circumstances a police officer
searching for evidence will be unaware that the subject of his
search is a parolee and will be adequately deterred by the
likelihood that any illegally obtained evidence would be excluded
at trial. Even if the illegal search is conducted by a parole officer,
the "harsh deterrent of exclusion"; is unwarranted, Thomas
insisted, because their exist other deterrents, such as departmental

17Id. at 2020.
158 id.
159

Id. at 2020-2 1.

160 Id.
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training and discipline and the threat of damages actions.161 Justice
Thomas also viewed parole officers, in contrast to police officers,
as not "'engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," but rather as officials whose "primary concern is whether
their parolees should remain free on parole." Thus, he concluded,
"their relationship with parolees is more supervisory than
adversarial.' 62
Justice Souter's take on the parole revocation process was quite
different from the majority's. First, he argued that "[i]n reality a
revocation proceeding often serves the same function as a criminal
trial, and the revocation hearing may very well present the only
forum in which the state will seek to use evidence of a parole
violation, even when the evidence would support an independent
criminal charge."' 63 Second, while at times a police officer may
not know he is dealing with a parolee, that is most frequently not
the case and that fact is significant because (a) the police,
especially those employed by the state that run the parole system,
have a reason for concern with the outcome of a revocation
proceeding because they do not want to lose that recommitment
any more than they care to lose a trial, (b) the actual likelihood of
trial is often far less that the probability of a parole revocation
proceeding, and (c)the cooperation between parole and police
officers in many cases "casts serious doubt upon the aptness of
treating police officers differently from parole officers. . ."'6 That
is because "[p]arole officers wear several hats; while they are
indeed the parolees' counselors and social workers, they also
'often serve as both prosecutors and law enforcement officials in
their relationship with probationers and parolees."' Consequently,
Justice Souter pointed out, once the parole officer "has turned from
counselor to adversary, there is every reason to expect at least as
much competitive zeal from him as from a regular police
officer."165

161

Id.

162

id.

Id. at 2023 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'MId. at 2025 (Souter, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

163
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With regard to the other deterrents to parole officers of which the
majority spoke, such as "departmental training and discipline and
the threat of damages actions," Justice Souter pointed out that the
same "might be said of the police, and yet as to them such
arguments are not heard, perhaps for the same reason that the
Court's suggestion sounds hollow as to parole officers."''
There
is no departmental training regulation, there is no evidence of
parole officers being disciplined and there is no evidence of a
single damage suit being brought by a parolee for an illegal
search. 167
In 1974, as Chief of the Legal Aid Society's Criminal Appeals
Bureau, I created a Parole Revocation Defense Unit which was
separately funded and still exists. My perspective of the nature of
the parole revocation process is closer to Justice Souter's than
Justice Thomas. Where there was no meaningful factual defense
for our client, we made the best case we could for non-revocation
based on a social work plan that we put together with our social
work staff. In this context, the revocation proceeding was
generally mellow and non-adversarial. But where there was a
factual defense to a violation charge, the proceedings took an
adversarial turn, the parole officers aggressively pressed to have
the charges sustained and we were equally aggressive in our crossexamination of witness or presentation of affirmative proof in
rebuttal. The parole officer was no longer the counselor or social
worker; he or she was the prosecutor. As for the Parole Board
itself, its members, lay and otherwise, were capable of making
judicial decisions and did so quite formally.
Nonetheless, I doubt that even if the majority and the dissenters
were in agreement about the realities of the parole revocation
process, the outcome in Scott would have been different. As I said
earlier, this is a Court that has not had a taste for the exclusionary
rule for a very long time. Not only has it limited the rule's
applicability to non-criminal trial proceedings, it has interdicted
federal habeas review of any Fourth Amendment issue no matter
how grievous the search or seizure," and it has interposed a good
16Id. at 2026 (Souter, J., dissenting).

1 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
'sStone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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faith exception to the warrant requirement that allows searches and
seizures to occur regardless of whether the warrant complies with
the Fourth Amendment as the Framers contemplated it should. 6 9
While I believe that Mapp v. Ohio'7" has more than earned its keep,
I am fully aware that many disagree. 71 Thus, if I were asked to
underwrite an insurance policy on Mapp, I would do so --- but the
premiums would be high.
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELFINCRIMINATION
In United States v. Balsys, 72the Court, with Justice Souter
writing for the majority, held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination cannot be invoked based on one's fear of
foreign prosecution. Although the holding is easily stated, the
manner by which it was reached is quite complex. The Court
found itself revisiting history, examining the soundness and scope
of language in prior cases, and weighing and rejecting several
substantial policy arguments that were tendered by Balsys and
embraced by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, in his
dissent.
Balsys is a resident alien living in Woodhaven, New York. He
entered the country in 1961 on an immigrant visa and alien
registration issued at the American Consulate in Liverpool. In his
sworn application, he said that he had served in the Lithuanian
Army from 1934 to 1940 and had been in hiding in Lithuania from
1940 to 1944. He also signed a statement of understanding that if
his application contained any false or misleading statements, or
concealed any material fact, he would be subject to criminal
prosecution and deportation.1 73

6

9United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See William E. Hellerstein, The Prince of Darkness and the Shortness of
Memory: Harold Rothwax's Guilty: The Collapse of Criminal Justice, 62
170
171

BRooKLYN L. REv. 1137, 1140-45 (1996).
172

173

118 S. Ct. 2218 (1998).
Id. at 2221-22.
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The Justice Department's Office of Special Investigation (OSI)
suspected Balsys was a Nazi War Criminal. If the case could be
made, Balsys would face deportation as such and also for lying on
his visa application. As part of its investigation, OSI subpoenaed
Balsys to testify at a deposition. He asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege and refused to answer any questions about his wartime
activities or in connection with his immigration to the United
States in 1961. He based his claim of privilege on the ground that
his answers could subject him to criminal prosecution by
Lithuania, Israel and Germany. 174
In a lengthy and scholarly opinion written by Judge Calabresi,
the Second Circuit ruled in Balsys' favor. 175 In a lengthy and
equally scholarly opinion, Justice Souter's opinion for the Supreme
Court made Balsys a loser. Though I would love to do it, time
does not allow me to walk you through the numerous and complex
issues that the majority and dissenting opinions traverse. But I
think that I can point you to the heart of the case which, I believe,
resides in two main segments of Justice Souter's opinion, those
dealing with the meaning of the Court's 1964 decision in Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission,176 and the relationship of a
governmental grant of immunity to the privilege against selfincrimination, as articulated by the Court in Kastigar v. United
7
States.
Murphy, as you may recall, held that the Fifth Amendment
protects a witness in any American court from incriminating
himself under either federal or state laws. Recall also that Murphy
was decided on the same day as Malloy v. Hogan,178 which held
that the Fifth Amendment privilege was applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Murphy overruled United States v. Murdock,179 which held that a
witness in a federal proceeding could not invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege on the basis of probable incrimination under
74

1

Id.

176

United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 1997).
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).

17

406 U.S. 441 (1972).

178

378 U.S. 1 (1974).

15

179284 U.S. 141 (1931),

af'd,U.S. v. Burdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
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state law. In reaching that result, the Murdock Court stated that
the English evidentiary rule on which the Fifth Amendment was
based embodied a "same sovereign" principle, which meant that it
did not protect a witness from answering questions that could be
used to convict him in other countries.18 As Justice Souter stated,
Murdock stood for "the unqualified proposition that fear of
prosecution outside the jurisdiction seeking to compel testimony
did not implicate a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment privilege...
"1181

The critical issue in Balsys was what was the true nature of the
Court's holding in Murphy. Did Murphy hold, as Justice Goldberg
speaking for the Court argued, that Murdock had been premised on
a misreading of English law which properly understood, did not
adhere to a "single sovereign" rule? l" Or, was it based on the fact
after Malloy v. Hogan, retention of Murdock would undermine the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment to both federal and state
prosecutions because a State, now bound by the Fifth Amendment,
could use self-incriminating testimony that had been compelled by
the federal government, and vice versa?
Well, Justice Goldberg's opinion held both and Judge
Calabresi's opinion for the Second Circuit concluded that
Goldberg's historically based assault on Murdock's "single
sovereignty rule" would extend to cover situations in which a
witness could face prosecution in a foreign country. Justice Souter
attacked Judge Calabresi's assumption by attacking the premise on
which it rested -- namely Justice Goldberg's understanding of
English law, which Justice Souter concluded was flawed. In a
word, Justice Souter argued that Justice Goldberg misread the
English cases that predated the Constitution and had
inappropriately relied on later English cases that were decided 50
years after the Fifth Amendment had been adopted. 8 3 For the
detail of the battle as to whose reading of English law is correct,
you will have to compare Justice Souter's opinion with Justice
Breyer's dissent.
180Id.
at 149-50.
181 Balsas,

118 S. Ct. at 2226.

181
Murphy, 378 U.S. at 67.
8
1 3 Balsas, 118 S. Ct. at 2230.
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Having resolved the Murphy-Murdock historical battle against
Murphy, Justice Souter found Murphy's true holding grounded in
the practical effect, in our federal system, of the decision in Malloy
v. Hogan. Justice Souter explained that in light of Malloy and the
ability of prosecutors to overcome the privilege with grants of
immunity, it would be "intolerable" to permit what Murphy
described as "whipsawing,"in which a state or federal prosecutor
could "eliminate the privilege by offering immunity less complete
than the privilege's dual jurisdictional reach."'" Murphy's holding
means that prosecutors' immunity powers may only be exercised
"on the understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions [are]
as one," and that if state immunity statutes do not provide the
required protection, a federally mandated exclusionary rule comes
into play. 19
Justice Souter recognized that the Murphy opinion spoke very
expansively about the values which underlay the Fifth Amendment
privilege. He noted that Justice Goldberg had identified a number
of "fundamental values and... noble aspirations" as being
reflected in the privilege including "our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life.... ."16 However,
Justice Souter concluded that Justice Goldberg's "comparatively
ambitious conceptualization of personal privacy underlying the
Clause" was flawed. The policies Murphy listed in its catalog of
values, Justice Souter argued, do not support an expansion of the
scope of the privilege.'"
For example, the absolutist view
suggested by Justice Goldberg's word "inviolability" is
inconsistent with the recognized power of prosecutors to compel
testimony as long as immunity is granted consistent with the extent
of the privilege. In other words, because the privilege is
inextricably entwined with incrimination, it is hard to argue that it
functions to protect privacy or the inviolability of the human
personality because, as Justice Souter noted, "when a witness's
response will raise no fear of criminal penalty, there is no
'1

Id. at 2227-28.

1 id.
86

d.at 2232.

1

8 Id.
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protection for testimonial privacy at all." ' This is what I meant
when I spoke earlier about the centrality of Kastigarto the Balsys
decision. As Justice Souter explained further, the privilege does
not serve as the protector "of personal testimonial inviolability, but
as a conditional protection of testimonial privacy subject to basic
limits recognized before the framing and refined through immunity
doctrine in the intervening years."' 89
From this vantage point, Justice Souter proceeded to deliver the
coup de grace to Balsys' entire constitutional argument. To accept
the proposition that the Fifth Amendment protected against the risk
of foreign prosecution, the government would not be in a position
to exchange immunity for testimony since a domestic grant of
immunity would not be binding in a foreign prosecution, and
therefore the government could not demand the testimony.
"Extending protection as Balsys requests," Souter pointed out,
"would change the balance of private and governmental interests
that has seemingly been accepted for as long as there has been
Fifth Amendment doctrine. ' ' 9°
Justice Souter also rejected Balsys' argument that Murphy's
policy catalogue supports application of the privilege in order to
prevent the Government from overreaching to facilitate foreign
of "cooperative
a
spirit
in
prosecutions
criminal
He observed that Murphy recognized
internationalism."' 191
"cooperative federalism" -- the teamwork of state and federal
officials to fight interstate crime but this only explained the
significance of Murphy's holding that a federal court could no
longer ignore fear of state prosecution when ruling on a privilege
claim. In Balsys, he noted, there is no counterpart to Malloy, that
could impose the Fifth Amendment beyond the National
Government.' 92 Consequently there is no premise in Murphy,
Souter concluded, for appealing to "cooperative internationalism"
by analogy to "cooperative federalism."' 93 Souter also added that
' 8 Id. at 2232-33.
89
Id. at 2232.
190 Id.
9' Id. at 2233.
'92 Id. at 2234.
193 id.
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it was unlikely that the benefits of applying the privilege because
of fear of foreign prosecution would outweigh the costs: a foreign
government might well allow use of the witness' silence in an
American court to be used against the witness so the witness would
gain nothing from the privilege, whereas the American court would
have lost the benefit of the testimony the witness could have
provided.""
Justice Stevens concurred briefly and emphasized that the costs
of extending the privilege to protect against the risk of foreign
prosecutions were too great. If a person could refuse to testify
because of a risk of foreign prosecution, "we would confer power
on foreign governments to impair the administration of justice in
this country. A law enacted by a foreign power making it a crime
for one of its citizens to testify in an American proceeding against
another citizen of that country would immunize those citizens from
'195
being compelled to testify in our courts.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a brief dissent, arguing that the
"fundamental decency" embodied in the Fifth Amendment requires
respect for the privilege in this country regardless of the identity of
the sovereign the witness fears will prosecute him.' 9 5
Justice Breyer argued in dissent that Murphy's rejection of
Murdock's same sovereign rule was correct both in its historical
analysis and in the Court's understanding of the privilege, and that
both, not federalism, constituted the basis for the Court's decision
in Murphy.'9' He also took issue with Justice Souter's argument
that applying the privilege to claims of foreign incrimination
would impair law enforcement. He reasoned that "foreign
application" of the privilege would be consequential only in cases
where a person could not be prosecuted domestically but the threat
of foreign prosecution is substantial. He also argued that the list of
policies and purposes Murphy said the privilege serves are "all
well served by applying the privilege when a witness legitimately
fears foreign prosecution.... ." The practical problems that might
result could be overcome through "de facto immunity," which
1 4Id. at 2235.

'19956 d. at 2236 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Id. at 2236-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

" Id. at 2237-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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could be achieved by promising the witness that he will not be
deported to a country he fears will prosecute him. 198
Balsys is both a difficult case to parse briefly and to conclude
who has the better of the argument. If one is sympathetic to a
broad reading of the Fifth Amendment because one shares the
types of sentiments expressed by Justice Ginsburg and reflected in
Justice Breyer's reading of Murphy, then the decision is painful.
Because I share those sentiments, I was pleased with the approach
taken by Judge Calabresi for the Second Circuit. But I doubted
that despite the erudition of his opinion, it would survive. That is
because I have long harbored the belief that many of the broadly
stated values underlying the Fifth Amendment, as set forth in
Murphy, are not necessarily consistent with the way the privilege
actually works. Thus I find myself constrained to agree with the
heart of Justice Souter's analysis--that the privilege affords only a
"conditional protection of testimonial privacy" that comes undone
in the face of an immunity grant.
There are also some pragmatic arguments that may give the
majority the edge. My colleague, Professor Dan Capra of
Fordham Law School, has argued that "[e]xtension of the privilege
to foreign prosecutions would mean that the government could not
obtain incriminating testimony about domestic crimes when the
information could also be relevant to a foreign prosecution. ' 9,
This would matter, he states, "in a case where an individual could
be prosecuted domestically as well as in a foreign country." He
points out that "[t]he government might in such a case decide that
it is worth it to give the individual immunity in order to obtain
information to aid in the prosecution of others. But if the Fifth
Amendment protected against the risk of foreign prosecution, the
government could never get the information from the individual-even if it would be essential in the prosecution of other people. 2 °
In an era of rapid, ever-increasing globalization of criminal and
terrorist activity, Professor Capra's point is a powerful one.

' 98 Id. at 2244-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

199 Daniel J. Capra, The Fifth Amendment and the Risk of ForeignProsecution,
N.Y. L.J., July 10, 1998, at 3.
200id.
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THE "EXCULPATORY NO" DOCTRINE
The last case I want to discuss with you is Brogan v. United
States.20 1 It was one of the several decisions handed down in
which the Court interpreted a federal criminal statute, not the
Constitution, although the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination hovered about the case until the
Court blew it off.
At issue in Brogan was whether there is an exception to criminal
liability under the federal false statement statute, 18 U.S.C.
§1001, 2"2 that consists of the mere denial of wrongdoing. A
number of federal courts, with varying rationales, had carved into
the statute a defense that came to be known as the "exculpatory
no" doctrine. This meant that Section 1001 did not make it a
crime, when asked by a federal agent if you robbed the First
National Bank, to answer "No." I believe many lay people and a
goodly number of lawyers and judges thought that, in a land with
the privilege against self-incrimination in its firmament, such a
response could not possibly be and certainly should not be
punishable. They were wrong.
Federal agents had evidence that Brogan, a union officer, had
received money from the JRD Management Corporation, a real
estate company whose employees were represented by the union.
The agents paid a surprise visit to Brogan's home and asked him if
had received gifts from the company. He answered "no." This
single syllable response led to his conviction for making a false
statement within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, in violation of
Section 1001. 203 The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
201

118 S. Ct. 805 (1998).
28 U.S.C. § 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States kmowingly and

willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or

fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any
false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned no more than five years
or both.
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Winter, rejected the exculpatory-no doctrine and affirmed
Brogan's conviction.2 '
With Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Supreme Court
affirmed. In a word, Justice Scalia said "read the statute." He
pointed out that no one, including petitioner, contended that the
exculpatory no doctrine is supported by a literal reading of the
statute, which says "any false statement."' ' The main argument
presented by Brogan for avoiding the literal reading was that
simple false denials do not implicate the harm sought to be
prevented by the statute: the "perverting of governmental
functions."' ' The argument was based on the Court's decision in
United States v. Gilliland,°7 which interpreted a predecessor of the
false statements statute and identified Congress' intent as
preventing the "perversion" of governmental functions by deceitful
practices.208 Justice Scalia pointed out that Gilliland'sdicta should
not be read as a limitation on the statute's reach. In fact, he
stressed that Gilliland's holding rejected an implied limit on the
statute's reach. Moreover, he could not "imagine how it could be
true that falsely denying guilt does not pervert a governmental
function." 209
Justice Scalia also rejected Brogan's argument that a literal
reading of the statute violates the "spirit" of the Fifth Amendment
privilege by placing a suspect "in the 'cruel trilemma' of admitting
guilt, remaining silent, or falsely denying guilt. '2' 0 He pointed out
that the privilege does not confer a privilege to lie but instead
permits a person to remain silent. He noted that the "cruel
trilemma" concept first appeared in Justice Goldberg's opinion in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,21' where it was used to explain
the importance of the right to remain silent. However, he stated
203 Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 807-08.

0 United States v. Brogan, 96 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 1996).
5
20
Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808.
' Id. at 808-09.
2w 312 U.S. 86 (1941).
o Brogan, 118 S. Ct. at 808-09.

0 Id.

210

Id. at 809-10.

211 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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that "[i]n order to validate the 'exculpatory no,' the elements of
this 'cruel trilemma' have now been altered - ratcheted up as it
were, so that the right to remain silent, which was the liberation
from the original trilemma, is now itself a cruelty."' Scalia also
rejected Brogan's argument that abolishing the doctrine would lead
to overzealous prosecutors punishing the mere denial of a crime
more severely than the actual crime. He stated that this argument
should be addressed to Congress.1 3
Justice Ginsburg concurred but stated that she was concerned
about the broad authority that the statute grants prosecutors and
which creates the risk that they will manufacture section 1001
violations because they are much easier to prove than the offenses
being investigated. 1 4 Justice Souter joined most of the majority
opinion but shared Justice Ginsburg's concerns. 2 5
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented and argued
that the Court should not abolish what he considered a well-settled
interpretation of section 1001 simply because of the literal reading
of the statute. 21 6 He believed that Justice Ginsburg was correct in
pointing out that Congress did not intend to make every
"exculpatory no" a felony. "Even if that were not clear," he stated,
"I believe that Court should show greater respect for the virtually
uniform understanding of the bench and bar that persisted for
decades .... 21 7
The Brogan case is a law professor's dream. While not rising to
the ranks of Melville's Billy Budd, it is an excellent example of
how a Court approaches a statute whose language literally
commands one result but one that is counter-intuitive to what many
believe and which may be far beyond what Congress intended.
Although Justice Ginsburg, unlike Justice Stevens and Breyer,
could not bring herself to ignore the sweeping generality of section
1001's language,2 8 she made a number of significant points to
212 Brogan, 118

S. Ct. at 810.

2131Id.

214

Id. at 812-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 812 (Souter, J., concurring).
216
1d. at 817 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218
1Id.at 812 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
215
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which Congress would do well to attend. First, is that the function
of law enforcement is the "prevention of crime and the
' 219
apprehension of criminals," not "the manufacturing of crime. ,
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg reminded us that the Department of
Justice has long maintained a policy against bring 1001
prosecutions for statements amounting to an "exculpatory no." In
fact, she noted that even after the Fifth Circuit abandoned the
exculpatory no doctrine, the Justice Department adhered to its nonprosecution policy. She noted further that at the very time that
charges were filed against Brogan, the United States Attorney's
Manual stated that "Where the statement takes the form of an
'exculpatory no', 18 U.S.C. Section 1001 does not apply regardless
who asks the question.''20 Second, she pointed out that the
Sentencing Guidelines evince a similar policy judgment. Although
Section 3C1.1 of the Guidelines Manual "establishes a two-level
increase for obstruction of justice, the application notes provide
that a 'defendant's denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under
oath that constitutes perjury) ...is not a basis for application of
this provision.""'n' Whether Congress will act to bring section
1001 in conformity with the widely held sense that government
should not be prosecuting individuals who answer "no" to a
government agent when asked if they are guilty of a crime remains
to be seen.
Well, I'll end where I began. There was much sound in this
year's criminal cases but not much fury. The constitutional cases
that I have discussed do not reach landmark status and do not, as a
generality, have enormous reach. Even the 5-4 decisions seemed
relative to prior terms lacking in acerbity between the majority and
dissent.
With the exception of Brogan, time did not allow for me to take
you through the Court's statutory work in criminal cases this past
Term but you should be aware that it was extensive. Indeed, it
could be said that it was a Term in which Congress did not, so the
Supreme Court did. In the criminal field alone, the Court decided
219

d.at 814 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356

U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
' Id.at 815 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
"' Id. at 815 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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cases involving interpretations of several firearms statutes,' the
substantive and conspiracy provisions of the RICO statute,'m the
federal bribery statute,24 and the Assimilative Crimes Act.m
I would like to close with a personal note about the Brogan case.
The case was argued on Brogan's behalf by Stuart Holtzman.
Stuart was my colleague for several years at the Criminal Appeals
Bureau of the Legal Aid Society and a friend for more than 30
years. At Stuart's request, I convened a moot court of several of
my faculty colleagues and others at Brooklyn Law School shortly
before Stuart's argument in the Supreme Court. Several weeks
after the argument, out of nowhere, Stuart was fatally stricken with
a rare disease. He died without ever knowing the outcome of his
argument, his first before the Supreme Court. Stuart was highly
respected by the judges in the Southern and Eastern Districts
before whom he regularly appeared. Although he lost the case, I
would like the record to reflect that his work on behalf of Mr.
Brogan was, as it always had been for any client, of the highest
quality. Thank you.

' See Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998) (The term "willfully" in
§ 924 (a)(1)(D) of the Firearms Owners's Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922 et
seq., requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not
that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement). Id. at 1944-47; Caron v.
United States, 118 S. Ct. 2007 (1998) (Massachusetts law that permitted
convicted felon whose civil rights had been restored to possess rifles but not
handguns activated the "unless" clause of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) excluding
previous conviction as predicate offense for sentence enhancement for a threetime violent felon who violates federal weapons possession statute, if the
"unless
offender's
civil
rights
have
been
restored,
the
person
may
such... restoration... expressly
provides that
not... possess... firearms," even though the case involved rifles and
shotguns). Id. at 2010-12; Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).
The phrase "carries a firearm"[during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime]
in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) applies to a person who knowingly possesses and
conveys firearms in a vehicle, including in the locked glove compartment or
trunk of a car, which the person accompanies. Id. at 1914-16.
' Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997).
224 Id.

Lewis v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1135 (1998). The child victim provision
of Louisiana's first degree murder statute was not assimilated into federal law
under the Assimilated Crimes Act. Id. at 1142-45.
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